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Abstract
Regional agreements on standards have been largely ignored by economists and
unconditionally blessed by multilateral trade rules. We ￿nd, theoretically and empir-
ically, that such agreements increase trade between participating countries but not
necessarily with the rest of the world. Adopting a common standard in a region, i.e.
harmonization, boosts exports of excluded developed countries to the region but re-
duces exports of excluded developing countries - possibly because developing country
￿rms are hurt more by an increase in the stringency of standards and bene￿t less from
economies of scale in integrated markets. Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs)
are more uniformly trade promoting unless they contain restrictive rules of origin, in
which case intra-regional trade increases at the expense of trade with other, especially
developing, countries. We propose a modi￿cation of international trade rules to strike
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d1 Introduction
In their recently launched trade talks, the European Union and the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed to focus not on tari⁄s and quotas but on what Pascal
Lamy, the EU trade commissioner, called "the real 21st century trade issues": harmo-
nizing standards.1 This is the latest episode in a process of deep integration that is most
advanced within the European Union but also underway in many other regions. Two fac-
tors explain the shift in regional negotiating emphasis away from conventional barriers
and toward standards. First, multilateral negotiations have achieved remarkable reduc-
tions in tari⁄s and quotas but done relatively little to reduce the trade restrictive impact
of technical barriers. Second, while multilateral trade rules governing regional agreements
on tari⁄s seek at least in principle to balance the interests of integrating countries and the
rights of excluded countries,2 the rules treat regional agreements on standards as always
benign and worthy of encouragement.3
Are regional agreements on technical barriers indeed an unambiguous blessing for
global trade? The voluminous research on regionalism with its almost exclusive focus on
tari⁄s and quotas provides no adequate answer. This paper is a ￿rst step in the theoretical
and empirical analysis of regional initiatives on technical barriers to trade. Using a simple
analytical model, it asks: How must the conventional analysis of free trade areas and
customs unions be modi￿ed to apply to agreements on standards? And what elements of
international agreements on standards are relevant to predicting their impact on patterns
of trade? Then employing a specially constructed panel dataset that directly identi￿es
di⁄erent types of policy initiatives in each manufacturing industry, the paper addresses
two empirical questions: Do regional agreements on standards lead to signi￿cant increase
1The two groups of countries have ageed to begin by harmonizing sanitary standards in the agricultural
and ￿sheries sector, as well as technical standards for electronics and wood-based industries. Pascal Lamy,
the EU trade commissioner said that the choice was driven by the belief that "the real 21st century trade
issues were standards and rules in areas such as safety, health or consumer protection", rather than tarri⁄s
or quotas ("EU and Asean to pave way for trade pact talks", Financial Times, 7 September 2004.)
2These rules are in Article XXIV of GATT 1994.
3Article 2.7 of the WTO￿ s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade encourages members to "give
positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other members, provided they are
satis￿ed that these regulations adequately ful￿ll the objectives of their own regulations." This provision
would seem to allow a country to selectively recognize standards of other countries, without violating the
fundamental obligation not to discriminate between its trading partners. There is no mention of the rights
of, or obligations vis-￿-vis, countries that happen not to receive "positive consideration."
2in trade between participating countries? And what happens to trade with those that are
left out?
Agreements on standards raise issues that are both politically and analytically chal-
lenging. Unlike tari⁄s, standards cannot be simply negotiated away because the original
reason for their existence is not trade protection but the enhancement of welfare by rem-
edying market failure - arising, for example, from invisible safety attributes of products,
negative environmental externalities, or product incompatibility due to the producers￿
failure to coordinate. Agreements on standards must therefore secure the gains from inte-
grated markets without unduly compromising the role of standards as remedies for market
failure. Not only are the motives for standards ostensibly honorable, so in principle is their
implementation: unlike tari⁄s, the same standards are imposed on both foreign and do-
mestic ￿rms. However, in spite of the supposed symmetry of treatment, the impact on
trade may turn out highly asymmetric because the costs of compliance are likely to di⁄er
across countries.
There are in fact three main types of agreements dealing with technical barriers to
trade. The simplest, and potentially most powerful is the mutual recognition of existing
standards, whereby a country grants unrestricted access of its market to products that
meet any participating country￿ s standards. This was the approach taken in principle by
the European Union, with the spur of the Cassis de Dijon judgement of the European
Court of Justice. Mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) are, however, not likely to be
an option if there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the initial standards of the countries, as
became evident in the context of the European Union.4
In such cases, a certain degree of harmonization is a precondition for countries to al-
low products of other countries to access their markets. The most important example of
such harmonization is the New Approach of the European Union, which resulted in a set
of directives from the European Commission setting out essential health and safety re-
4The central problem in the EU mutual recognition approach is the overarching exemption contained
in Article 36 of the EC treaty. This provision preserves the member countries￿rights to restrict or prohibit
imports on grounds of health and safety and other policy objectives, as long as this is not ￿a means of
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade￿ . This provision substantially dilutes the e⁄ects
of implementing mutual recognition because it allows a country with stringent regulations not to recognize
as equivalent the regulations of other countries with lower stringency.
3quirements for most regulated products.5 Available evidence suggests that harmonization
within the EU tended toward the high range of initial standards. Vogel (1995) points out
that the role of the Union￿ s richest and most powerful members, which imposed the most
stringent standards, has been critical in setting the EU standards agenda; their political
and economic importance has served to make EU standards progressively stricter.6
In many other cases, neither mutual recognition nor harmonization of substantive
standards may be deemed feasible or desirable. Countries may nevertheless choose at
least to mutually recognize each other￿ s conformity assessment requirements, i.e. country
A trusts country B to certify that the products made by country B conform to country A￿ s
standards. Examples of such initiatives are the intra-EU MRAs on some unharmonized
industries and the EU￿ s agreements with a number of other countries. A key element of
these agreements is the rule of origin.7 The MRAs between the EU and USA and the
EU and Canada specify that conformity assessment done in one of the MRA countries,
in which products are manufactured or through which they are imported, is accepted
throughout the entire agreement region. Other agreements, such as the MRAs the EU
has concluded with Australia and New Zealand, impose restrictive rules of origin which
require that third country products continue to meet the conformity assessment of each
country in the region.
As a prelude to our empirical investigation of the e⁄ects of these agreements on trade
patterns, a simple analytical model is used to generate certain testable hypotheses. The
main analytical results can be explained by drawing a partial analogy between standards
harmonization and mutual recognition, on the one hand, and a customs union and a free
trade area, on the other. As in the case of a customs union, the economic impact of stan-
5In practice, most of the broad manufacturing product areas where technical regulations are important
have now been harmonized, particularly product areas where the mutual recognition approach was seen
to be failing.
6EC (1998) Single Market Review concludes that the harmonized standards in most reviewed industries
have been set higher than initial levels in most member countries. The history of EU automobile emission,
chemical, and packaging standards also demonstrates that these standards have frequently been harmonized
at a level slightly lower than that preferred by the Union￿ s most stringent states, including Germany,
Denmark, and Netherlands, but higher than favored by less strict members such as Italy, UK, and Spain
(Vogel, 1995).
7"Rules of origin" are de￿ned by the WTO as "the criteria used to de￿ne where a product was made.
They are an essential part of trade rules because a number of policies (such as preferential trade agreements)
discriminate between exporting countries."
4dards harmonization depends on the level at which the harmonized standard is set. Unlike
the case of a customs union, standards harmonization has a market integration e⁄ect that
creates scale economy bene￿ts for the ￿rms of not just participating but also third coun-
tries. The impact on the ￿rms of a speci￿c country depends on how the costs of meeting
the new harmonized level of the standard compare with the bene￿ts from economies of
scale in integrated markets. We ￿nd that if ￿rms from one set of countries ("developing")
have a higher variable cost of meeting a standard and reap fewer scale economy bene￿ts
in integrated markets than ￿rms from another set of countries ("developed"), then the
former can su⁄er a decline in exports to the integrated market when harmonization raises
some destination countries￿standards.
As in the case of a free trade area, the economic impact of a standards MRA depends
critically on the choice of rules of origin. For the participating countries, an MRA is in
e⁄ect a downward harmonization of standards since ￿rms are now free to meet the least
costly of the initial standards: trade is stimulated not only by market integration but
also by the reduced stringency of the standard. The analytical implications for imports
from third countries di⁄er dramatically with rules of origin. If ￿rms of third countries are
denied the bene￿ts of the MRA and must continue to meet the original standard in each
market, then they will face unchanged absolute conditions but su⁄er a decline in relative
competitiveness - and hence a decline in exports to the region. In contrast, if the ￿rms of
non-participating countries are also entitled to access the entire region by conforming to
the least costly standard, then they too reap bene￿ts. In this case, it is shown that ￿rms
from the set of countries ("developing") where it is more costly to meet a standard may
bene￿t more, because there is a greater reduction in their compliance costs thanks to the
decline in the stringency of the standard.
In order to test the empirical validity of these propositions, we construct the ￿rst
dataset that directly identi￿es policy initiatives of di⁄erent types on standards for manu-
facturing industries in 42 countries over the period of 1986-2001.8 These include all OECD
countries and 14 developing countries that are the largest exporters of manufactured goods
outside the OECD and account for over 80% of non-OECD manufactured exports. The
8In contrast, the existing Perinorm dataset describes standards and technical regulations, but does not
allow an unambiguous measurement of harmonization or mutual recognition.
5policy measures include each harmonization directive and MRA concluded between the
countries in the set. We concord the policy measures, which often pertain to a speci￿c
attribute (e.g. safety) of a variety of products, with trade data at the SITC (revision 2)
3-digit industry level. We then estimate the signi￿cance of the impacts of these measures
on bilateral trade across countries and over time, controlling for other in￿ uences.
Our evidence broadly con￿rms the conclusions drawn from the model. Regional har-
monization signi￿cantly increases intra-regional trade in a⁄ected industries. Exports to
the region of excluded developed countries also increase, but exports of excluded devel-
oping countries decline. These asymmetric e⁄ects may arise because developing country
￿rms are hurt more by an increase in the stringency of standards and bene￿t less from
economies of scale in integrated markets. Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) pro-
mote trade both within the region and with the rest of the world. But when they contain
restrictive rules of origin, then intra-regional trade increases at the expense of trade with
other, especially developing, countries.
To place our contribution in the context of the existing literature,9 the analytical
section builds on the work of Baldwin (2000) and Ganslandt and Markusen (2001). In
particular, Baldwin (2000) anticipated some of the results of this paper on MRAs, but
assumed identical countries with identical ￿xed costs of complying with standards. So the
implications of harmonization and asymmetric e⁄ects on excluded countries were beyond
the scope of that model. As far as we know, only two previous studies have empirically
explored the impact of shared standards on trade. Swann et al (1996) regressed British
net exports, exports and imports over the period 1985-1991 on counts of voluntary na-
tional ("idiosyncratic") and international standards recognized by the United Kingdom
and Germany. They discovered that international standards to which Britain was a party
had little impact on imports but a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on exports while British
national standards tended to raise both imports and exports. Moenius (1999) regressed
bilateral trade volumes in 4-digit SITC sectors on counts of shared standards in a sample
of 14 countries over 16 years, and found a positive and highly signi￿cant relationship. Our
paper di⁄ers from these empirical contributions in a number of aspects. First, instead
9See Maskus and Wilson (2001) for a review of the literature.
6of relying on approximate measures of shared standards, we directly identify harmoniza-
tion directives and mutual recognition initiatives in speci￿c industries across countries,
and also distinguish between the impacts of these two types of measures. Second, we
examine not only the e⁄ect on trade between participating countries, but also on trade
with excluded countries. Finally, we allow for di⁄ering impacts of harmonization across
destination markets, depending on whether they previously had more or less stringent
standards, and across source countries, depending on the level of development.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the analytical
model and identify the main implications for trade of di⁄erent types of initiatives. We
discuss the data in Section 3, and present the empirical evidence in Section 4. In Section
5, we examine the robustness of our estimates. Section 6 concludes the paper and draws
out the implications for the design of international trade rules.
2 Model
We construct a model that enables us to capture the essence of regional initiatives on
standards while allowing a⁄ected countries to be heterogeneous. Each country imposes a
mandatory standard sj, which a ￿rm must meet in order to sell its goods to the country￿ s
consumers.10 To keep the model fairly general, we do not specify a particular rationale
for the standard. However, to motivate the analysis, it is convenient to think of a safety
standard which pertains to a product attribute (e.g. in￿ ammability) that cannot be
independently observed by consumers.11 But the assurance that a particular product meets
a higher standard has a positive impact on consumer demand for the product and thus a
￿rm￿ s revenue.12
Compliance with the standard is assumed to a⁄ect both the marginal and ￿xed costs
10We take sj as given in this paper, even though the level of sj in each country could be treated
as endogenously determined, based on factors such as preferences, market size, income, and technology.
Allowing standards to be optimally set, prior to and after harmonization, would signi￿cantly complicate
the analysis without providing much additional insight into the issues addressed here.
11Most EU harmonization directives have set out essential requirements that are targeted at the safety
of the product user and protecting the user￿ s health (from infection, toxins, explosion, cuts or wounds from
mechnical parts, electric shock, burning, falls, etc.).
12One exception in the EU New Approach is the "Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive". This
directive aims at reducing a negative consumption externality, such as pollution, and thus does not cause
shift in consumer demand. However, our ￿ndings also apply to this type of standard.
7of ￿rms. We assume that the marginal cost of production is identical for all ￿rms in
a particular country i and proportional to the level of the standard in the destination
market j, sj, i.e. ci(sj) ￿ cisj. Furthermore, a ￿rm (denoted by a) in country i must
incur a ￿xed cost of production, denoted by Fa
i , to meet each distinct standard in the
destination markets to which it sells. There is a continuum of ￿ n potential ￿rms in each
country i with their ￿xed cost, Fa
i , uniformly distributed between Fi and Fi + ￿F, i.e.
Fa
i ￿ UNIF [Fi;Fi + ￿F].13 Fa
i is assumed to be independent of the level of the standard
in the destination market, sj.
First, we consider the ￿rms￿ behavior. We assume that ￿rms treat markets with
di⁄erent standards as segmented, i.e. a ￿rm will not ￿nd it worthwhile to supply multiple
markets by complying with the most stringent standard.14 In contrast, ￿rms treat markets
with the same standard as a single market when making entry decisions and subsequently
competing in quantities. Solving backwards, a representative ￿rm (￿rm a) that is located
in country i and sells in all markets with the same standard at sj, chooses its output qij
to solve the following pro￿t-maximization problem:
max
qij
X
j
￿a
ij =
X
j
Rij
￿
sj;
P
z
qzj;qij
￿
￿
X
j
cisjqij ￿ Fa
i ; (1)
where j represents any market that sets the standard at sj, and Rij denotes the revenue
that is a function of si. Note that ￿rms only need to incur a single ￿xed cost to serve all
the markets with the standard set at sj. The ￿rst-order condition is:
@Rij
￿
sj;
P
z
qzj;qij
￿
@qij
￿ cisj = 0; (2)
which yields the pro￿t-maximizing reaction function, i.e. qij = qij (qzj) where z 6= i. By
solving all reaction functions simultaneously, we ￿nd q￿
ij for each i as a function of nzj (8z),
13Alternatively, we could have assumed that ￿rms in each country i must incur identical ￿xed costs.
The assumption in the text simpli￿es the analysis with little loss of generality.
14In other words, the di⁄erence in total variable costs of complying with any two standards is larger than
any saving in ￿xed costs from meeting just the stricter one. Our assumption also holds when the issue
is not vertical di⁄erentiation of products on some quality dimension, but the incompatibility of products
that conform to di⁄erent standards (e.g. two-prong versus three-prong plugs).
8the number of ￿rms from country z selling in market j. Denote V ￿
ij = Rij
￿
sj;
P
z
q￿
zj;q￿
ij
￿
￿
cisjq￿
ij as the revenue less the variable cost realized in market j at the pro￿t maximum.
Suppose Nj number of markets set the same standard as country j.15 A ￿rm would
choose to enter these Nj markets simultaneously only if the nonnegative total pro￿t con-
dition holds:
P
j ￿a
ij = NjV ￿
ij ￿ Fa
i > 0.
Next consider importing country markets. The number of ￿rms from country i that
supply each of these Nj markets, denoted by nij, can be found by solving the following
equation:
nij = ￿ n ￿
NjV ￿
ij ￿ Fi
￿F
; (3)
because, in each country i, there is a continuum of ￿ n ￿rms with their ￿xed cost uniformly
distributed between Fi and Fi + ￿F. Rewriting the above equation, we get nij as a
reaction function of the number of rival ￿rms from every other country z (z 6= i), i.e.
nij = nij(nzj). Solving the reaction functions simultaneously for all j, we obtain the
equilibrium number of ￿rms in any market j from each source country, i.e. n￿
ij. Hence,
the total imports of market j from country i is given by Qij = n￿
ijq￿
ij.
The goal of our model is to analyze the impact on bilateral trade of a policy initiative
that deals with standards. For this purpose, we ￿rst characterize the impact on the imports
of market j from country i by totally di⁄erentiating Qij:
dQij = n￿
ijdq￿
ij + q￿
ijdn￿
ij +
X
z
￿ @q￿
ij
@nzj
￿ n￿
ij ￿ dn￿
zj
￿
: (4)
On the right hand side of the above equation, the ￿rst argument shows the direct e⁄ect
on Qij of a change in the individual ￿rm￿ s output; the second argument represents the
direct e⁄ect on Qij of a change in the number of ￿rms from country i; the third argument
re￿ ects the indirect e⁄ect of a change in the number of ￿rms from each source country
through its in￿ uence on an individual ￿rm￿ s output.
Let￿ s take a closer look at the elements of equation (4). First of all, a change in the
15In this model, we assume that destinations markets only di⁄er in the level of the standard.
9level of the standard has a direct impact on an individual ￿rm￿ s output, indicated by:
dq￿
ij =
￿
@q￿
ij=@sj
￿
dsj: (5)
Furthermore, based on equation (3), both Nj and sj determine the number of ￿rms from
each source country supplying market j. Thus, at equilibrium, dn￿
ij can be de￿ned as:
dn￿
ij =
X
z
￿
@nij
@nzj
￿ dnzj
￿
=
X
z
￿
@nij
@nzj
￿
1
￿zj
￿
V ￿
zj ￿ dNj + Nj ￿
@V ￿
zj
@sj
￿ dsj
￿￿
; (6)
where ￿ij ￿ ￿Ni(@V ￿
ij=@nij) + ￿F=￿ n > 0. Note that in this paper we assume ci >
maxf@R￿
ij=@sj;c
ﬂ
g, which indicates @V ￿
ij=@sj, @Qij=@sj < 0, i.e. ￿rms would not voluntarily
produce a quality that exceeds the level of the standard when the standard pertains to
some unobserved attribute of a product.16
Taking into account equations (5) and (6), equation (4) can be rewritten as:
dQij =
1
￿ij
X
z
"
￿ij
X
m
￿
@nzj
@nmj
V ￿
mj
￿
+ #ijV ￿
mj
#
dNj +
(7)
"
Nj
￿ij
"
￿ij
X
m
￿
@nzj
@nmj
@V ￿
mj
@sj
￿
+ #ij
@V ￿
zj
@sj
#
+
@q￿
ij
@sj
nij
#
dsj;
where ￿ij ￿ nij(@q￿
ij=@niz) and #ij ￿ q￿
ij(@nij=@niz).
The impact on imports of country j from i of any policy initiative that deals with
standards is made up of two elements: the e⁄ect of market integration (dNj) and the e⁄ect
of change in the standard (dsj). The ￿rst argument on the right-hand-side of equation
(7) captures the aggregate impact of market integration on imports through a change in
the number of supplying ￿rms. When dNj > 0, there is an increase in the number of
destination markets served by incurring a single ￿xed cost, which promotes economies of
scale and thus spurs market entry. The second argument re￿ ects the direct and indirect
16c
ﬂ
is de￿ned in Appendix B.1. This assumption is in alignment with Akerlof (1970), who ￿nds that, in
the presence of information asymmetry in qualities, all ￿rms would produce the lowest quality possible at
equilibrium. When a positive level of standard is adopted to partially correct the market failure, ￿rms are
forced to meet the standard.
10e⁄ects of a change in the level of the standard, respectively, on the number of ￿rms and
￿rms￿output. Assessing the relative strengths of these two e⁄ects helps us determine the
overall impact on imports of any regional initiatives that deal with standards.
We are particularly interested in exploring the possible asymmetric e⁄ects of regional
agreements on standards in a heterogeneous world. We assume that the world consists
of two types of countries: type K and type L, which di⁄er in terms of their ￿rms￿costs
of complying with standards, i.e. ci and Fi. Two broad cases are possible: (i) cK < cL
and FK > FL or (ii) cK < cL and FK 6 FL. Our analysis focuses on case (i) for several
reasons. First of all, case (i) is more analytically challenging, and once the implications
in this case are established, those in case (ii) can be worked out quite straightforwardly.
More importantly, case (i) may more accurately depict situations where ￿rms from both
rich and poor countries produce the same product. It is likely that ￿rms from richer
capital-abundant countries (type K) tend to adopt a more capital-intensive technology
that requires a relatively large Fi, while ￿rms from poorer labor-abundant countries (type
L) tend to adopt a more labor-intensive technology that requires a relatively large ci. In
fact, the World Bank￿ s (2004) Technical Barriers to Trade Survey reveals that a ￿rm￿ s
percentage of compliance cost spent on product re-design for each export market (cor-
responding to Fi in our paper) is positively correlated with the GDP per capita of the
country in which it is located, whereas that spent on hiring additional labor for production
and testing (corresponding to ci in our paper) is negatively correlated with the GDP per
capita of the country. This limited evidence does not, however, provide the basis for an
a priori assertion that type K countries correspond to developed countries and type L to
developing countries. Rather, we treat this correspondence as a hypothesis to be tested
in the empirical section.
In the rest of this section, we examine the impact on both intra-regional trade and
trade with excluded countries of two types of regional initiatives: upward harmonization
and downward harmonization (with or without rules of origin).
112.1 Upward harmonization
We begin by investigating the impact on trade when a subset of type K countries, denoted
by H ￿ fhg, harmonize their standards at the level of the initially most stringent stan-
dards, maxfsj : j 2 Hg. The objective of such an approach, re￿ ecting roughly the EU￿ s
directives in the 1990s, would be to integrate markets without compromising the role of
the standard as a remedy for market failures in any country.
First, we look at the set of countries within H for which dsj = 0; i.e. the countries
in the harmonizing region with the most stringent initial standards. The impact on ￿rms
selling in these markets is solely due to the market integration e⁄ect (i.e. the increase
in Nj). All exporters to these markets reap economies of scale since they now serve the
entire region incurring one single ￿xed cost. But such market integration bene￿ts are
greater for ￿rms of type K countries, since Fk > Fl and they enjoy a larger reduction in
the per-market ￿xed cost. So we shall certainly see increased entry of ￿rms and imports
from type K countries. However, for ￿rms of type L countries, the direct bene￿ts from
increased economies of scale are counteracted by the more intense competition from ￿rms
of type K countries. Nevertheless, imports from type L countries may still increase if the
former e⁄ect is not completely o⁄set by the latter.
Next we look at the set of countries within H for which dsj > 0; i.e. the countries
with initial standards less stringent than the eventual harmonized level. Intuitively, the
bene￿t to ￿rms of increased scale economies may be partially or even completely eroded
by the increased cost of complying with stricter standards. Provided the initial distance
between standards, and hence the upward adjustment of standards, is below a certain
threshold value, the imports of harmonizing markets from type K countries will increase.
However, imports from type L countries are more likely to decrease because the direct
bene￿ts of economies of scale are now counteracted by two factors: type L ￿rms realize
smaller economies of scale (because they have lower ￿xed costs than type K ￿rms ), and are
hurt more by the increase in the level of the standard (because they have higher variable
costs of meeting a standard). Whether the imports from type L countries actually decline
depends on the extent of their cost disadvantage.
The overall impacts on imports of harmonizing countries are summarized below:
12Proposition 1 When region H harmonizes standards at maxfsj : j 2 Hg,
(i) imports of harmonizing markets with dsj = 0 from type K countries increase, whereas
those from type L countries increase if cl < ￿ g(ck);
(ii) imports of harmonizing markets with dsj > 0 from type K countries increase if
dsj < ￿￿ s, whereas those from type L countries decrease if cl > g
ﬂ
(ck).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Moreover, we compare the impacts of upward harmonization across destination markets
and ￿nd:
Proposition 2 The increase in imports of harmonizing market j, i.e. dQij, from any
exporter i is a strictly decreasing function of dsj.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
The intuition is obvious: the higher dsj, the more the scale economy boost to imports
is diluted by the higher costs of compliance with standards.
2.2 Downward harmonization (mutual recognition)
Consider now the impact on trade when the countries of region H decide to mutually
recognize (MR) one another￿ s standards. In other words, products that comply with a
standard set by any participating country can be freely sold in the entire region. It is
straightforward to establish that such mutual recognition is equivalent in e⁄ect to the
downward harmonizing of standards at the level of minfsj : j 2 Hg, since ￿rms are free
to comply with the least strict standard in the region.
The impact on trade with third countries turns out to depend on whether the bene￿ts
of MR are extended to third country ￿rms. When the bene￿ts of mutual recognition
are restricted to ￿rms within region H, the markets of individual countries in this region
remain segmented, with the same initial standards, to ￿rms outside the region. Although
the absolute conditions of access remain unchanged, ￿rms of excluded countries face a
decline in relative competitiveness because ￿rms of participating countries not only realize
13greater economies of scale but also may enjoy reduced stringency of standards. The
implications of such mutual recognition di⁄er sharply for ￿rms within the region from
those in excluded countries, as summarized below:
Proposition 3 When region H harmonizes standards at minfsj : j 2 Hg and imposes
restrictive rules of origin, then
(i) intra-regional trade increases at the expense of imports from the rest of world;
(ii) in the rest of the world, type L countries see a larger decline in their exports to region
H if cl > g1(ck).
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
In contrast, when the bene￿ts of mutual recognition are open to all ￿rms, the results
in certain respects mirror those presented in Proposition 1. As in the case of upward
harmonization, all ￿rms reap the bene￿ts of increased economies of scale due to market
integration. But there is now an additional bene￿t arising from the downward adjustment
of the standard in certain countries. Although both of these e⁄ects may encourage entry
and boost total trade, they are asymmetrically distributed between exporter countries.
Type K ￿rms with larger ￿xed costs tend to bene￿t more from scale economies whereas
type L ￿rms with a higher variable cost of compliance derive greater bene￿ts from reduced
stringency of the standard. When there is a signi￿cant downward adjustment of the
standard, the rise in exports of countries of type L may be greater than that of type K.
Proposition 4 If region H harmonizes standards at minfsj : j 2 Hg and does not impose
restrictive rules of origin, then
(i) imports of region H from type K countries ￿both within the region and in the rest
of the world ￿increase, whereas those from type L countries increase if cl < ￿ g(ck);
(ii) the increase in the total imports of region H from excluded type L countries is greater
than that of excluded type K countries if cl > g2(ck) and
P
H dsj < ￿s
ﬂ
.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
143 Data
We employ a balanced dataset, from COMTRADE, covering the trade of 42 countries
at the SITC rev. 2 3-digit level of manufacturing industries from 1986 to 2001. The
sample consists of 28 OECD countries and 14 developing countries that are the largest
manufacturing exporters outside the OECD (and have complete sectoral import data).17
Inevitably, there exist some null observations since not all countries trade in each industry
every year, and so it is appropriate to use the Tobit model for estimation.
We identify the industries, countries and the time period that are a⁄ected by each
directive or MRA drawing upon the relevant o¢ cial documents, and then construct the
variables displayed in Table 1. The harmonization directives and MRAs are not directly
related to speci￿c products but to product attributes.18 Thus a single industry (e.g. elec-
tronic products) may be a⁄ected by multiple directives (e.g. those pertaining, respectively,
to low voltage equipment and electromagnetic compatibility). Di⁄erent approaches can
be taken to quantify the harmonization measures, depending on how these measures are
believed to a⁄ect trade. It is simplest, and seems reasonable, to assume that the impact is
linearly related to the number of directives in each industry, i.e. each additional directive
in any industry has an identical incremental a⁄ect on trade. Alternative assumptions are
possible, e.g. that additional directives have a diminishing e⁄ect on trade, or that the
nature of the impact di⁄ers in each industry. We established that the results are not
sensitive to the choice of approach.
HARijrt counts the number of directives applicable to industry r between exporter i
and importer j in year t. HAR_Mijrt counts the number of directives applicable to in-
dustry r between importer j and any country other than exporter i in year t. For instance,
HAR_Mijrt = 1 for imports of United Kingdom from China in the sector of machinery
tools since 1995, because the United Kingdom has implemented a single directive applica-
ble to machinery tools along with other EU members at the end of 1994. HAR_Eijrt
measures the number of directives implemented in industry r between exporter i and any
country other than importer j in year t.
17Czech Republic and Slovak Republic are excluded because of the lack of sectoral trade data in 1993
while Belgium and Luxembourg are considered as one unit throughout the period.
18The lists of EU directives and MRAs are provided Table A.1 and Table A.2 in Appendix A.
15Table 1: Notations in estimation
Regressand
ln(importijrt) the natural logarithm of the imports of country j from country
i in industry r and year t
Fixed e⁄ects
￿irt exporter-industry-year
￿jrt importer-industry-year
￿ijr exporter-importer-industry
Regressors
HARijrt the number of harmonization directives between i and j in
industry r and year t
HAR_Mijrt the number of harmonization directives between j and any
country other than i in industry r and year t
HAR_Eijrt the number of harmonization directives between i and any
country other than j in industry r and year t
MRA_ROijrt 1 if an MRA with rules of origin exists between i and j in
industry r and year t, and 0 otherwise
MRA_RO_Mijrt 1 if an MRA with rules of origin exists between j and any
country other than i in industry r and year t, and 0 otherwise
MRA_RO_Eijrt 1 if an MRA with rules of origin exists between i and any
country other than j in industry r and year t, and 0 otherwise
MRA_NROijrt 1 if an MRA without rules of origin exists between i and j in
industry r and year t, and 0 otherwise
MRA_NRO_Mijrt 1 if an MRA without rules of origin exists between j and any
country other than i in industry r and year t, and 0 otherwise
MRA_NRO_Eijrt 1 if an MRA without rules of origin exists between i and any
country other than i in industry r and year t, and 0 otherwise
RTAijt 1 if an RTA exists between i and j, and 0 otherwise
RTA_Mijt 1 if an RTA exists between j and any country other than i,
and 0 otherwise
RTA_Eijt 1 if an RTA exists between i and any country other than j,
and 0 otherwise
16MRA_ROijrt and MRA_NROijrt are dummy variables that re￿ ect the existence
of an MRA, respectively, with or without the rules of origin between exporter i and
importer j in industry r in year t. The cases where importer j reaches an MRA with
or without the rules of origin with any country other than exporter i are respectively
represented by MRA_RO_Mijrt and MRA_NRO_Mijrt. The same de￿nitions apply
to MRA_RO_Eijrt and MRA_NRO_Eijrt except that the party involved in an MRA
is the exporter. The rest of the regressors are dummy variables constructed in a similar
fashion to capture the existence of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).19
4 Empirical evidence
In this section, we examine empirically the impact of the di⁄erent approaches that deal
with technical barriers to trade. The main equation we estimate takes the following form:
ln(importijrt) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
￿+￿irt+￿jrt+￿ijr
+￿1HARijrt+￿2HAR_Mijrt+￿3HAR_Eijrt
+￿4MRA_ROijrt+￿5MRA_RO_Mijrt+￿6MRA_RO_Eijrt
+￿7MRA_NROijrt+￿8MRA_NRO_Mijrt+￿9MRA_NRO_Eijrt
+￿10RTAijt+￿11RTA_Mijt+￿12RTA_Eijt
+"ijrt
which can be denoted as y = X￿ + " with y representing ln(importijrt), X the vector of
explanatory variables, ￿ the vector of coe¢ cients and " the error term.
Three types of ￿xed e⁄ects are included: the nested exporter-industry-year ￿xed e⁄ect
captures factors such as sectoral output in the exporting country at a particular time,
the nested importer-industry-year ￿xed e⁄ect controls for factors such as sectoral demand
and domestic competition in the importing country at a particular time, while the nested
importer-exporter-industry ￿xed e⁄ect includes any time-invariant bilateral sectoral ele-
19We include RTAs e⁄ective in our sample countries over the period of 1986-2001, including the EC,
EFTA, CEFTA, NAFTA, and the CER (the Closer Economic Relations agreement between Australia and
New Zealand).
17ments such as distance. The use of these extensive ￿xed e⁄ects enables us to isolate the
role of agreements on technical regulations in explaining the changes in the pattern of
trade over time.
4.1 The estimated e⁄ects of harmonization and MRAs
Table 2 reports the estimation results using the Tobit model. Coe¢ cients on all variables
are statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level and exhibit the signs predicted in Section
2. Column I reveals that the harmonization directives unambiguously stimulate intra-
regional trade, as well as trade with excluded countries. In fact, the magnitudes of the
estimated impacts are quite large. It would appear that a directive implemented in an
industry between two countries on average raises their imports from each other by 32%
(e0:2749 = 1:32), and imports from a country outside the harmonizing region by nearly 10%
(e0:0950 = 1:096). The boost to trade is attributable to the positive impact of increased
scale economies which outweighs, on average, the possible negative e⁄ect on trade of
increased stringency in some countries￿standards.
The impact of an MRA, as predicted in Section 2, turns out to be sensitive to whether
it includes restrictive rules of origin. MRAs with rules of origin provide a powerful stim-
ulus to intra-regional trade but at the expense of imports from countries outside the
region.20 The negative coe¢ cient on MRA_RO_M, -0.4768, implies that imports from
an excluded country su⁄er a 38% decline in a⁄ected industries. However, when an MRA
does not include restrictive rules of origin, imports from both member countries and
third countries increase, indicated by the positive coe¢ cients on both MRA_NRO and
MRA_NRO_M. Finally, regional trade agreements are found on average to increase
trade not only between participating countries but also with the rest of the world.21
20The substantial magnitude of the coe¢ cient on MRA_RO may be explained by the trivial amount of
initial trade in the a⁄ected industries before the implementation of MRAs.
21The literature on the impact of RTA on extra-bloc trade is mixed. Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1997)
examine intra- and extra-bloc trade for eight RTAs-EC, EFTA, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and the Andean
Pact, AFTA, the CER, and the East Asian Economic Caucus for the period 1970-1992. Their study
suggests that RTAs had positive impacts on all trade ￿ ows except for the EC￿ s intra-bloc trade and
EFTA￿ s and NAFTA￿ s trade with nonmembers. The authors conclude that there is little trade diversion.
Soloaga and Winters (2001) ￿nd that RTAs between developing countries increase extra-bloc trade. In
particular, ASEAN since 1980 increases intra-bloc trade, extra-bloc imports, and extra-bloc exports. Our
estimates suggest that the average e⁄ect of these agreements is positive.
18Table 2: Estimated e⁄ects of harmonization and MRAs
Regressand: ln(import) I II
Harmonization on intra-regional trade 0.2749*** 0.2562***
(HAR) (0.010) (0.011)
importers with stricter initial standards 0.0989***
(HAR ￿ strictness) (0.022)
Harmonization on imports from the ROW 0.0950*** 0.0310***
(HAR_M) (0.005) (0.005)
importers with stricter initial standards 0.2477***
(HAR_M ￿ strictness) (0.011)
Harmonization on exports to the ROW 0.6438*** 0.6393***
(HAR_E) (0.005) (0.005)
MRAs with rules of origin on intra-regional trade 2.3540*** 2.3589***
(MRA_RO) (0.031) (0.031)
MRAs with rules of origin on imports from the ROW -0.4768*** -0.4799***
(MRA_RO_M) (0.037) (0.037)
MRAs with rules of origin on exports to the ROW 0.3956*** 0.3963***
(MRA_RO_E) (0.036) (0.036)
MRAs without rules of origin on intra-regional trade 0.6362*** 0.6390***
(MRA_NRO) (0.074) (0.074)
MRAs without rules of origin on imports from the ROW 0.7794*** 0.7950***
(MRA_NRO_M) (0.037) (0.037)
MRAs without rules of origin on exports to the ROW 1.6235*** 1.6154***
(MRA_NRO_E) (0.037) (0.037)
RTA on intra-regional trade 1.7225*** 1.7266***
(RTA) (0.011) (0.011)
RTA on imports from the ROW 0.0458*** 0.0404***
(RTA_M) (0.005) (0.005)
RTA on exports to the ROW 0.0309** 0.0292***
(RTA_E) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of observations 4160352 4160352
Log likelihood -7840111 -7839841
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Exporter/Importer-industry-year, pair-industry ￿xed e⁄ects are controlled.
***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% signi￿cance levels, respectively.
19In Section 2, Proposition 2 predicted that trade stimulus is negatively correlated with
the extent by which the importing country raises its standard - because an increase in
the stringency of the standard may partially or completely o⁄set the bene￿t from market
integration and dampens imports. As noted in the introduction, the European Union￿ s
richest members generally imposed the most stringent standards, and used their in￿ uence
to ensure that the EU￿ s harmonized standards were set close to their own levels. The avail-
able evidence suggests that the core set of countries with relatively strict initial standards
consists of Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands (Vogel, 1995). We also considered
alternative de￿nitions, e.g. the top third of EC and EFTA countries ranked by GDP per
capita in 2001, and the results were similar.
An additional interactive term, strictness, is generated to test Proposition 2. For the
harmonizing countries which can be presumed to have stricter initial standards, strictness
is equal to 1; 0 for the rest of harmonizing importers. In column II of Table 2, the signi￿cant
coe¢ cient on the variable "HAR ￿ strictness" con￿rms that the increase in imports of
these two groups of countries di⁄ers signi￿cantly in magnitude. Intra-regional imports of
countries that were likely to have raised their standards during harmonization increase by
29%, considerably less than the 43% increase for countries with initially stricter standards.
This sharp di⁄erence is also evident in imports from outside the harmonizing area. Imports
of countries with less strict initial standards from a third country increase by 3%, while
imports of countries with stricter initial standards increase by 32%.22 The rest of the
coe¢ cients are similar to those in column I.
4.2 The divergent impact on imports from third countries
Do regional agreements in standards have a similar impact on exporters everywhere in the
rest of the world? As discussed in Section 2, ￿rms that incur a larger ￿xed cost of complying
with country-speci￿c standards reap larger bene￿ts from scale economies, while ￿rms that
incur a higher variable cost of compliance will su⁄er (bene￿t) more from any increase
(decline) in the stringency of the standard. Any asymmetry in costs can thus be expected
22As we gradually expand the set of countries deemed to have stricter initial standards (on the basis
of GDP per capita), the magnitude of the coe¢ cients on the interacting terms becomes smaller. This
tendency indicates that the three countries considered here are appropriate elements of the subset with
the most stringent standards.
20to lead to quite di⁄erent e⁄ects on exporters in di⁄erent origins.
As we suggested in Section 2, the distinction between countries according the level
of development may correspond to the analytical distinction we make between countries
on the basis of their costs of meeting standards. We generate a dummy variable, i.e.
developing, which is equal to 1 for a developing country exporter and 0 for a developed
country exporter. We consider all OECD countries as developed and the rest of the sample
countries as developing. This dummy variable is used to interact with the three variables
which capture the impact on imports from third countries: HAR_M, MRA_RO_M,
and MRA_NRO_M. The regression results are reported in column I of Table 3.
While regional harmonization promotes imports from developed third countries by
34%, there is actually a 16% reduction in imports from the excluded developing world
(the coe¢ cient on HAR_M for developing country exporters is -0.1675 and e￿0:1675 =
0:84). These results are consistent with the assumption, which drives the predictions
in Proposition 1 in Section 2, that developing countries tend to ￿nd it more costly to
meet stricter standards, and reap smaller bene￿ts from economies of scale generated by
integrated markets (i.e. ck < cl and Fk > Fl).
The impact of MRAs on developing and developed countries turns out to depend on
whether they include rules of origin. If they do, they hurt developing country exports
(39% decline) more than they hurt developed country exports (28% decline). But MRAs
without rules of origin enhance developing country exports even more than they enhance
developed country exports, revealed by the positive coe¢ cient on the interacting term
MRA_NRO_M ￿ developing. A possible explanation is o⁄ered by the intuition behind
Proposition 4 in Section 2: the greater reduction in compliance costs for developing country
￿rms may o⁄set the smaller bene￿ts they derive from economies of scale.
Finally, we directly test for the hypotheses in Proposition 1 by comparing respectively
the four cases: the importer had more/less stringent initial standards while the exporter
is a developed/developing country. Column II of Table 3 shows that with harmoniza-
tion, exports to countries with stricter initial standards of both developed and developing
countries increase, but the increase in the former (57%) is much greater than the increase
in the latter (5%). Developed third countries￿exports to countries that raise their stan-
21Table 3: The divergent impact on imports from third countries
Regressand: ln(import) I II
Harmonization on intra-regional trade 0.3002*** 0.2825***
(HAR) (0.010) (0.011)
importers with stricter initial standards 0.0951***
(HAR ￿ strictness) (0.023)
Harmonization on imports from the ROW 0.2912***
(HAR_M) (0.007)
from developing countries -0.4587***
(HAR_M ￿ developing) (0.012)
from developed countries to importers with stricter initial standards 0.4491***
(HAR_M with developing = 0 & strictness = 1) (0.014)
from developing countries to importers with stricter initial standards 0.0458***
(HAR_M with developing = 1 & strictness = 1) (0.017)
from developed countries to importers with less strict initial standards 0.2369***
(HAR_M with developing = 0 & strictness = 0) (0.008)
from developing countries to importers with less strict initial standards -0.2421***
(HAR_M with developing = 1 & strictness = 0) (0.010)
Harmonization on exports to the ROW 0.6357*** 0.6315***
(HAR_E) (0.005) (0.005)
MRAs with rules of origin on intra-regional trade 2.3185*** 2.3233***
(MRA_RO) (0.031) (0.031)
MRAs with rules of origin on imports from the ROW -0.3294*** -0.3334***
(MRA_RO_M) (0.041) (0.041)
from developing countries -0.1792*** -0.1763***
(MRA_RO_M ￿ Developing) (0.044) (0.044)
MRAs with rules of origin on exports to the ROW 0.3204*** 0.3213***
(MRA_RO_E) (0.036) (0.036)
MRAs without rules of origin on intra-regional trade 0.6612*** 0.6641***
(MRA_NRO) (0.075) (0.075)
MRAs without rules of origin on imports from the ROW 0.8237*** 0.8379***
(MRA_NRO_M) (0.040) (0.040)
from developing countries 0.2267*** 0.2296***
(MRA_NRO_M ￿ Developing) (0.041) (0.041)
MRAs without rules of origin on exports to the ROW 1.5031*** 1.4952***
(MRA_NRO_E) (0.037) (0.037)
RTA on intra-regional trade 1.7331*** 1.7371***
RTA on imports from the ROW 0.0347*** 0.0295***
RTA on exports to the ROW 0.004 0.0027
22dards also rise (by 27%), but developing countries￿exports decline by 22%. These results
are consistent with the predictions in Proposition 1, and the assumption that developing
countries bene￿t less from economies of scale, and thus see a smaller increase in exports
to the market that does not increase the stringency of its standard and are hurt more
by an increase in the stringency of the standards in other markets to which their exports
decline.
These ￿ndings suggest that harmonization of standards is generally advantageous to
participating and excluded developed countries that have similar cost structures, but could
hurt the exports of developing countries. In the case of mutual recognition agreements,
excluded developed and developing countries have greater commonness of cause: absent
rules of origin both gain, with rules of origin both lose, with a larger impact on developing
countries in each case.
5 Robustness analysis
Our econometric results have been obtained with a range of controls designed to eliminate
any correlation between the endogenous variables and the error term. However, we cannot
rule out econometric problems arising for two reasons: omission of unobserved e⁄ects
and endogeneity of regressors. First of all, initiatives on standards may not be the only
measures that have drawn the countries of the European Union to trade closer together.
For example, it could be that liberalization of transport inside the EU has reduced the
costs of transport inside the Union faster than the costs outside the Union. Secondly,
it may be that the initiatives on standards have been taken in precisely those industries
in which trade between members was growing, so the initiatives are at least in part the
results rather than the cause of trade growth. In this section we address these concerns
and test the robustness of our results.
5.1 Unobserved e⁄ects
We ￿rst consider the possible omission of unobserved e⁄ects, which are not already embod-
ied in the multiple nested ￿xed e⁄ects included in Section 4. Such e⁄ects must therefore
23consist of time-variant bilateral factors such as the preferential political or economic re-
lations between two countries that might be correlated with the explanatory variables of
interest.
Following the approach suggested in Baltagi (2001) and originally due to Mundlak
(1978) on individual e⁄ects, we attempt to test and capture this time-variant bilateral
e⁄ect, denoted by ￿ijt, by assuming ￿ijt is a linear function of the averages of all the
existing explanatory variables (measures of regional initiatives) across industries:
￿ijt = ￿ Xijt:￿ + vijt; (8)
where ￿ Xijt: is a 1￿R vector of observations on the explanatory variables averaged across
industries. This e⁄ect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables if and only if ￿ = 0.
As Mundlak (1978) assumed, without loss of generality, the X are deviations from their
sample mean. The main equation to be estimated becomes:
y = X￿ + PX￿ + ￿; (9)
where P = IN ￿ IN ￿ IT ￿ ￿ JR, and the new error term has zero mean.
The estimation results with the control of unobserved time-variant bilateral e⁄ect are
reported in Table 4. The coe¢ cient on PX is statistically signi￿cant and positive, rejecting
the null of zero correlation between the unobserved e⁄ect and explanatory variables. It
suggests that over time a stronger bilateral relationship leads to a larger amount of sectoral
trade. Furthermore, note that the magnitude of most estimates has fallen except for the
coe¢ cients on HAR and MRA_RO, compared to column I in Table 2. This result shows
that consideration of the unobserved e⁄ect reduces the explanatory power of most of the
regressors but not of intra-EU harmonization and MRA with rules of origin.23 While this
test cannot be regarded as conclusive, at least the inclusion of a measure of unobserved
e⁄ects does not alter our qualitative conclusions.
23The considerable decrease in the coe¢ cients of RTA variables with the inclusion of ￿ijtis not surprising,
since RTA variables also measure time-variant bilateral relations.
24Table 4: Robustness analysis: unobserved e⁄ects
Regressand: ln(import) I
Harmonization on intra-regional trade 0.4561***
(HAR) (0.010)
Harmonization on imports from the ROW 0.0515***
(HAR_M) (0.005)
Harmonization on exports to the ROW 0.6046***
(HAR_E) (0.005)
MRAs with rules of origin on intra-regional trade 2.4154***
(MRA_RO) (0.031)
MRAs with rules of origin on imports from the ROW -0.7087***
(MRA_RO_M) (0.037)
MRAs with rules of origin on exports to the ROW 0.1738***
(MRA_RO_E) (0.036)
MRAs without rules of origin on intra-regional trade 0.3197***
(MRA_NRO) (0.074)
MRAs without rules of origin on imports from the ROW 0.2512***
(MRA_NRO_M) (0.037)
MRAs without rules of origin on exports to the ROW 1.1430***
(MRA_NRO_E) (0.037)
RTA on intra-regional trade 0.0539***
(RTA) (0.019)
RTA on imports from the ROW -1.2349***
(RTA_M) (0.012)
RTA on exports to the ROW -1.2540**
(RTA_E) (0.012)
Time-variant bilateral e⁄ect (PX) 11.2570***
Number of observations 4160352
Log likelihood -7834125
255.2 Endogenous regressors
The problem of endogenous regressors would lead to an overestimation of the trade-
enhancing e⁄ect of initiatives on standards if the initiatives were implemented where trade
was already growing rapidly. Formally, this concern can be expressed as
x = 1 if x￿ > 0 (10)
x = 0 otherwise,
where x refers to the endogenous regressor in the vector of explanatory variables X, and
x￿ = ￿0Z + v where Z represents a vector of exogenous/predetermined variables.
To correct for the endogeneity, we ￿rst use the Instrumental Variable (IV) approach.
If prior growth in trade led to the policy initiatives, then it would be appropriate to use
the lagged three-year average trade growth, i.e. growthijr(t￿1)(￿ Z), as an instrument.
To avoid the problem of identi￿cation, we construct a comprehensive indicator, denoted
by INI, that considers all the policy initiatives, i.e. harmonization, MRA with rules of
origin, and MRA without rules origin: INI = 1 if there exist any of the above initiatives
between the exporter and the importer at an industry in a particular year and 0 otherwise.
Column II of Table 5 reports the two-stage IV estimation results, while column I reports
the benchmark results where the potential endogeneity of regressors is not corrected. In
the ￿rst stage, the e⁄ect of lagged average trade growth on the initiatives, estimated
in a probit model, is signi￿cantly negative. This result suggests that two countries are
more likely to take a standards-related initiative in situations of relatively slow growth of
bilateral trade. In the second stage, we ￿nd that a 10% increase in the likelihood of an
initiative is associated with a 76% increase in trade. Put di⁄erently, the estimated e⁄ect
of INI after correcting for possible endogeneity is 1.5544, which is signi￿cantly larger
than the estimated e⁄ect reported in column I. These results suggest that if there were
an endogeneity problem, failure to correct for it would lead to an underestimation of the
impact of the initiatives.
As an alternative to the IV approach, we adopt the two-step estimator proposed by
26Table 5: Robustness analysis: endogenous regressors
I II III
Stage 1:
Initiative on lagged three-year average trade growth ￿ -0.1583*** -0.1583***
Stage 2: Regressand: ln(imports)
Initiative on intra-regional trade / 1.4821*** 1.5544*** / 1.5010***
Probability of the initiative on intra-regional trade 5.6690***
(INI / INI_PROB) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Initiative on imports from the ROW -0.0193* 0.3020*** 0.0618***
(INI_M) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Initiative on exports to the ROW 1.1464*** 1.3365*** 1.07***
(INI_E) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
RTA on intra-regional trade 1.8908*** 2.1206*** 1.6474***
(RTA) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
RTA on imports from the ROW 0.0911*** -0.0450*** -0.0471***
(RTA_M) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
RTA on exports to the ROW -0.0091 -0.0919*** -0.0787***
(RTA_E) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Generalized residual ￿ ￿ 6.4712***
Number of observations 1804781 1804781 1804781
Log likelihood -4598521 -4566748 -4536913
27Vella (1993) which deals with censored endogenous regressors.24 As in the previous IV
approach, we ￿rst estimate the e⁄ect of the lagged three-year average trade growth on
standards-related initiatives. Then we compute the generalized residual from the ￿rst
stage, i.e. E (^ vjx), to be included as an additional regressor in our original estimating
equation in column I. The original equation can be rewritten in terms of its conditional
expectation as follows:
E (yjx) = X￿ + ￿E (^ vjx): (11)
The two-step estimators are reported in column III of Table 5. The estimates obtained
in the second stage again con￿rm that correcting for endogeneity associated with the prior
trade growth rates leads to a slight upward revision of the impact of initiatives.
6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the implications for trade of various regional initiatives that deal
with technical barriers. Both analytically and empirically, we found that harmonization
and mutual recognition can have a signi￿cant positive impact on trade within the region
and with third countries. But there is a quali￿cation in each case. If the harmonized
standard is stricter than the initial standard in some countries, then the bene￿ts from
market integration in terms of economies of scale can be o⁄set by the increased production
cost due to a stricter standard. Countries with stricter initial standards witness a larger
increase in imports relative to those with less strict initial standards. Exports of developing
countries to the harmonizing region di⁄er sharply across destinations: their exports to
countries that raise their standards fall, whereas exports to the harmonizing countries
with stricter initial standards rise moderately.
When mutual recognition agreements contain restrictive rules of origin, then their
bene￿ts are con￿ned to countries within the region at the expense of imports from the rest
24Vella (1993) uni￿es the literature on censored endogenous regressors and self-selectivity bias, and
employs generalized residuals to adjust for the inconsistency caused by the endogeneity of the censored
regressors. The estimator proposed by this procedure (with binary censored endogenous variable), in the
case where X does not contain an intercept and only values of y corresponding to speci￿c values of x are
observed, is essentially the two-step estimator in Heckman (1979) that corrects the self-selectivity bias.
Hausman (1978) also argues that inconsistency due to the endogeneity of regressors can be adjusted by
the inclusion of the residuals in place of the predicted values of the endogenous variable.
28of the world, in particular, developing countries. When MRAs are open to ￿rms regardless
of origins, both intra-regional trade and trade with the rest of the world, especially with
developing countries, rise substantially.
We noted in the introduction that multilateral rules on goods trade have taken a per-
missive approach to regional agreement on standards. It is neither feasible nor desirable
to restrict the freedom of countries to harmonize or mutually recognize their standards.
However, more could be done to protect the rights of countries that are excluded from such
agreements. This is particularly important because few of the agreements on standards
include developing countries, and the big di⁄erences in social preferences over issues such
as safety and the environment suggest that few developing countries are likely to be party
to such agreements with industrial countries in the foreseeable future. Multilateral rules
should make it more di¢ cult to conclude agreements of the type that impose an unnec-
essarily high price of exclusion, especially on developing countries. Thus, the imposition
of restrictive rules of origin, which deny the bene￿ts of mutual recognition agreements to
third countries for no legitimate reason, should be outlawed. It is harder to prevent the
upward harmonization of standards. But it may be possible to build on the presumption
that international trade law already creates in favor of the use of international standards
by individual countries (in Articles 2.4 and 2.5 of the WTO￿ s Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade) and oblige countries that harmonize their standards to demonstrate
why international standards or the less strict of the original standards are not adequate
to meet their regulatory goals.
This paper should be seen as the beginning of a research program, and there remains
much scope for deepening the analysis. In particular, two types of industry-level data
would help: ￿rst, on how the level of harmonized standards compares with the standards
that countries originally imposed; second, the implications of complying with standards
for the cost of ￿rms, across industries and countries. Such data would make it feasible to
carry out the industry-level analysis that would ideally be the next step in this research
program.
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Table A.1: The New Approach Directives
Directives Reference
Low voltage equipment 73/23/EEC
Simple pressure vessels 97/23/EC
Toys 88/378/EEC
Construction products 89/106/EEC
Electromagnetic compatibility 89/336/EEC
Machinery 98/37/EC
Personal protective equipment 89/686/EEC
Non-automatic weighing instruments 90/384/EEC
Active implantable medical devices 90/385/EEC
Gas appliances 90/396/EEC
Hot water boilers 92/42/EEC
Civil explosives 93/15/EEC
Medical devices 93/42/EEC
Potentially explosive atmospheres 94/9/EEC
Recreational craft 94/25/EC
Lifts 95/16/EC
Refrigeration appliances 96/57/EC
Pressure equipment 97/23/EC
In vitro diagnostic medical devices 98/79/EC
Radio and telecommunications terminal equipment 99/5/EC
Cable installation designed to carry person 00/9/EC
Packaging and packaging waste 94/62/EC
High speed rail systems 96/48/EC
Marine equipment 96/98/EC
Table A.2: The MRAs of Conformity Assessment
MRA of Conformity Assessment Rules of Origin
EU and Australia Yes
EU and New Zealand Yes
EFTA and Australia Yes
EFTA and New Zealand Yes
INTRA EU Yes
EU and USA No
EU and Canada No
Australia and New Zealand No
Canada and Korea No
Canada and Swiss No
30Appendix B.1: Proof for Proposition 1.
Proof. (i) In markets with strictest initial standards, dsj = 0 and dNj > 0, and thus
equation (7) becomes
dQij =
1
￿ij
X
z
"
￿ij
X
m
￿
@nzj
@nmj
V ￿
mj
￿
+ #ijV ￿
zj
#
dNj; (a.1)
where ￿ij ￿ nij@q￿
ij=@niz and #ij ￿ q￿
ij@nij=@niz. Equation (a.1) can be further simpli￿ed
as
dQij =
dQij
dnij
X
z
@nij
@nzj
V ￿
zj
￿ij
dNj; (a.2)
where dQij=dnij = @Qij=@nij +
P
z (@Qij=@nzj)(@nzj=@nij). Denote ’ij ￿ (dQij=dnij)
P
z(@nij=@nzj)(V ￿
zj=￿ij).
Provided that @P￿
j =@Qij > SOCij=nij (SOCij ￿ 2(@Pj=@Qij)nij denotes the second-
order condition to maximize ￿ij), ￿q￿
ij=nij < @q￿
ij=@nij = ￿q￿
ij (@Pj=@Qij)=SOC < 0 and
thus @Qij=@nij = q￿
ij + nij@q￿
ij=@nij > 0. Furthermore, we ￿nd
@V ￿
zj=@nij =
@
￿
P￿
j Qzj
￿
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￿ czsj
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zj
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￿
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< 0;
because @P￿
j =@Qmj < 0 8m (the negative slope of the demand function),
@Qij
@nij
= q￿
ij + nij
@qij
@nij
= q￿
ij
￿
1 ￿
@Pj
@Qij
nij
SOCij
￿
=
1
2
q￿
ij > 0; (a.4)
(@P￿
j =@Qzj)Qzj + P￿
j = czsj at pro￿t maximization, and @qzj=@nij < 0. Thus,
@nzj=@nij = ￿
(￿ nNj=￿F)
￿
@V ￿
zj=@nij
￿
(￿ nNj=￿F)
￿
@V ￿
zj=@nzj
￿
￿ 1
< 0: (a.5)
31In addition, we know @Qij=@nzj = q￿
ij@nij=@nzj+nij@q￿
ij=@nzj < 0. Hence, dQij=dnij > 0.
Moreover, because @P￿
j =@Qkj = @P￿
j =@Qlj (products that meet the same standard
are identical to consumers regardless of the production location) and q￿
kj > q￿
lj, we
￿nd @qzj=@nkj < @qzj=@nlj (where @qzj=@nij = ￿q￿
ij (@Pj=@Qij)=SOCzj), as well as
(@P￿
j =@Qkj)(@Qkj=@nkj) < (@P￿
j =@Qlj)(@Qlj=@nlj) (where @Qij=@nij is de￿ned in (a.5)).
Therefore, @V ￿
zj=@nkj < @V ￿
zj=@nlj < 0, which unambiguously leads to @nkj=@nlj > ￿1.
Because the pro￿t-maximizing reaction function, i.e. qij = f
￿
qzjjz6=i
￿
, is a strictly
decreasing function of ci, given by
@qij
@ci
=
sj
@2Rij=@q2
ij
< 0 (a.6)
where @2Rij=@q2
ij < 0. At equilibrium, @q￿
ij=@ci < 0: We ￿nd that V ￿
ij is also strictly
decreasing when ci rises, because
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ij
@ci
=
@Rij
@qij
@q￿
ij
@ci
￿ sj
￿
q￿
ij ￿ ci
@q￿
ij
@ci
￿
< 0 (a.7)
given @Rij=@qij > 0 and @q￿
ij=@ci < 0. Thus, V ￿
kj > V ￿
lj. Because V ￿
kj > V ￿
lj > ￿(@nkj=@nlj)
V ￿
lj, ’kj > 0 and dQkj > 0.
As for dQlj, when dsj = 0, dQlj > 0 (i.e. ’lj > 0) if and only if V ￿
lj=V ￿
kj > ￿@nlj=@nkj,
where V ￿
ij ￿ (P￿
j ￿cisjq￿
ij) for i = k;l. The above condition holds when ((P￿
j ￿clsj)q￿
lj=(P￿
j ￿
cksj)q￿
kj =)(P￿
j ￿clsj)2=(P￿
j ￿cksj)2 > ￿@nkj=@nlj, where P￿
j > cisj, @nkj=@nlj is de￿ned
in (a.3) with i = k, and the ￿rst equality follows, at pro￿t maximum, P￿
j ￿@Pj=@qij￿cisj =
0. When cl < ￿ g(ck) ￿ 1=sj[Pj + ￿ b(Pj ￿ cksj)] where ￿ b ￿ ￿ [￿
￿
Nj=￿lj
￿
(@V ￿
lj=@nkj)]1=2,
(P￿
j ￿ clsj)2=(P￿
j ￿ cksj)2 > ￿@nkj=@nlj, ’lj > 0 and thus dQlj > 0; when cl > ￿ g(ck),
dQlj < 0.
(ii) In contrast, in markets with less strict initial standards, dsj > 0 and dNj > 0.
Equation (7) becomes
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32Denote  ij ￿ n￿
ij(@q￿
ij=@sj) + Nj=￿ij(dQij=dnij)
P
z(@nij=@nzj)(@Vzj=@sj).
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ij
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we ￿nd nkj < nlj. Furthermore,
@q￿
ij
@sj
=
@Pj
@sj ￿ ci
￿SOC
< 0; (a.10)
because ci > @Pj=@sj, and SOC < 0. Given ck < cl, we obtain @q￿
lj=@sj < @q￿
kj=@sj < 0.
Thus n￿
lj@q￿
lj=@sj < n￿
kj@q￿
kj=@sj < 0, where n￿
ij@q￿
ij=@sj denotes the direct e⁄ect of an
increase in sj that appears in equation (a.8). The second multiplier of dsj in equation
(a.8) denotes the indirect e⁄ect of an increase in sj. We consider ci > c
ﬂ
￿ @P￿
j =@sj +
(Nj=￿ij)(dQij=dnij)
P
z [(@nij=@nzj)(@Vzj=@sj)]SOC=n￿
ij, which indicates the negative
net e⁄ect of an increase in sj, i.e.  ij < 0. Denote the solution of dsj that sets (a.8) to
zero as ￿s
ﬂ
for i = k, which yields ￿s
ﬂ
= ￿(’kj= kj)dNj > 0. We conclude dQkj > 0 when
dsj < ￿s
ﬂ
while dQkj < 0 otherwise.
When dsj > 0, given another additional negative impact on dQlj arising from dsj > 0,
we know dQlj < 0 when cl > ￿ g(ck). When cl < ￿ g(ck), dQlj < 0 if and only if V ￿
lj=V ￿
kj <
￿ lj(dsj=dNj)1=[(dQij=dnij)=Vkj]￿@nlj=@nkj where  ij < 0. The above condition holds
when cl > g
ﬂ
(ck) ￿ 1=sj[Pj+ b
ﬂ
(Pj￿cksj)] where b
ﬂ
￿ ￿ [￿ (dsj=dNj)1=[(dQij=dnij)=Vkj]￿
￿
Nj=￿lj
￿
(@V ￿
lj=@nkj)]1=2. Because b
ﬂ
< ￿ b, g
ﬂ
(ck) < ￿ g(ck). Thus, we conclude that, when
dsj > 0 and cl >g
ﬂ
(ck), dQlj < 0.
Appendix B.2: Proof for Proposition 2.
Proof. As suggested in Appendix B.1, when ci > ~ c, the net e⁄ect of an increase in sj
is negative. Comparing the harmonizing markets of dsj = 0 with those of dsj > 0, we
￿nd that, in the latter markets, the positive market integration e⁄ect may be partially or
even completely o⁄set by the negative e⁄ect of dsj > 0. Thus, the increase in imports of
harmonizing market j, i.e. dQij, from any exporter i is a strictly decreasing function of
33dsj.
Appendix B.3: Proof for Proposition 3.
Proof. (i) In the case of mutual recognition with restrictive rules of origin, dnij > 0 for
i;j 2 H because dNj > 0 and dsj 6 0, and dnzj = 0 for z = 2 H in equation (6). Thus
dn￿
ij > 0 and dn￿
zj < 0. As a result, for i;j 2 H, given dsj 6 0, dn￿
ij > 0, dn￿
zj < 0, and
@nij=@nzj < 0, dQij > 0 in equation (4). For i 2 H;z = 2 H, and j 2 H,
dQzj
dnij
=
@Qzj
@nij
+
dQzj
dnzj
@nzj
@nij
< 0; (a.11)
and thus given dsj = 0 and dn￿
ij > 0, dQzj < 0.
(ii) For k;l = 2 H, j 2 H,
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(a.12)
= nlj
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Note nlj=nkj > dqkj=dqlj, because
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Therefore, nljdqlj=dnij < nkjdqkj=dnij. When cl > g1(ck) ￿ 1=sj[Pj+b
ﬂ
0(Pj ￿cksj)] where
b
ﬂ
0 ￿ ￿lj=(Nj@V ￿
lj=@nkj), @nlj=@nkj < ￿qkj=qlj, and qlj@nlj=@nij < qkj@nkj=@nij given
@nkj=@nij = ￿1 with i 2 H;k = 2 H. Therefore, d(Qlj ￿ Qkj)=dnij de￿ned in equation
(a.12) is negative. Given dn￿
ij > 0, d(Qlj ￿ Qkj) < 0 and thus dQlj < dQkj < 0.
Appendix B.4: Proof for Proposition 4.
Proof. (i) In the case of mutual recognition without rules of origin, dNj > 0 and dsj 6 0
34for exporters of all origins. When the exporter countries are type K (either within the
region or in the rest of the world) or type L with cl < ￿ g(ck), the e⁄ects of both dNj > 0
and dsj 6 0 are positive as shown in Appendix B.1. Thus, imports of any harmonizing
market from type K countries ￿both within the region and in the rest of the world ￿and
type L countries with cl < ￿ g(ck) increase, i.e. dQij > 0, dQkj > 0, dQlj > 0 for i; j 2 H,
k;l = 2 H.
(ii) As mentioned in Appendix B.1, the negative direct e⁄ect of dsj > 0, i.e. n￿
ij@q￿
ij=@sj,
is stronger for i = l. Next we consider and compare the indirect e⁄ect of dsj, i.e.
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P
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(a.5) for i = k;l and
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:
When cl > g2(Fk) ￿ @P￿
j =@sj+￿lj￿￿ b [(@P￿
j =@sj)￿ck+￿kj] with ￿zj ￿ (@P￿
j =@q￿
zj)(@q￿
zj=@sj)
and ￿ b ￿ (qkj=qlj)maxf￿kj=(Nj@V ￿
kj=@nlj);
￿
Nj=￿lj
￿
(@V ￿
lj=@nkj)g, we then obtain that
P
z (@nkj=@nzj)(@Vzj=@sj) > 0 as well as
P
z (@nlj=@nzj)(@Vzj=@sj) < 0. Overall, the
negative net e⁄ect of dsj > 0 is stronger for i = l, i.e.  lj <  kj < 0 where  ij is de￿ned
in Appendix B.1, which in turn suggests the positive impact of dsj < 0 is larger for i = l.
Now consider
P
j dQij given j 2 H, where dQij is de￿ned in equation (a.8). Denote
￿  = minf lj ￿  kjg < 0 for j 2 H. Then
X
j
dQlj ￿
X
j
dQkj =
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j
(’lj ￿ ’kj)dNj +
X
j
￿
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￿
dsj (a.15)
>
X
j
(’lj ￿ ’kj)dNj + ￿ 
X
j
dsj:
We ￿nd that
P
j dQij > 0 if
P
j dsj < ￿s
ﬂ
￿ ￿(1=￿ )
P
j(’lj ￿ ’kj)dNj.
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